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Institutional Structures and Defense SpendingThe Market Mechanism in the
Defense Department
MARTIN J. BAILEY
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
Although the use of internal or transfer prices among the subordinate
units of a large organization (e.g., the divisionalized firm), to simulate
the market mechanism's incentives to efficiency, has received consider-
able attention from economic theorists,' the application of this idea to a
government organization such as the Defense Department raises difficult
questions that remain largely unanswered. The most thorough review
of the problems involved was Breckner's, which emphasized the falli-
bility of superficial measures of the success of' organizations created.2
Breckner pointed out, among other things, that unless performance by
an organization is measurable and is readily checked, the market device
is unlikely to be a useful management tool. More broadly, we can say
that its usefulness surely depends on a proper arrangement of incentives
so as to harmonize the interests of each organization with those of the
Defense Department and of the nation.
However, we should recognize that many of the questions and diffi-
culties that attract discussion in connection with the notion of decen-
tralized organization are merely disregarded in discussions of cen-
tralized organization. Problems relating to mischievous incentives and to
the measurement of performance are no less problems of centralized
organization (in the private sector of the economy as well) than of a de-
centralized corporate or government organization. In the latter case, how-
'See Jack Hirshleifer, "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," Journal oj
Business,1956, p.172, and "Economics of the Divisionalized Firms,"ibid.,
1957, p. 96.
2NormanV. Breckner, "Government Efficiency and theMilitary 'Buyer-
Seller' Device," Journal of Political Economy, 1960, p. 469.174 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending
ever, they become an explicit subject of study and so attract notice. It is
therefore misleading to suppose that they stand in the way of the use of
decentralization as a management tool. Rather the resolution of these
problems can contribute to better management and to better perfor-
mance in both types of organization.
This paper addresses itself to a series of questions relating to the use
of the market mechanism: What present institutional arrangements in the
Defense Department involve a simulation of the market mechanism,
and what is their scope and aggregate importance? What degree of free-
dom of action is available to the sellers and to the buyers in these
arrangements, and how does this freedom affect the usefulness of the
device? In what ways could these arrangements be changed, and possibly
extended, to increase their value; in what new areas might it be appro-
priate to introduce the market mechanism? What problems limit the
effectiveness of the market mechanism? What can be done to make it
more effective? In what ways do these questions relate to the problems
of over-all good management and efficiency in the Defense Department?
And finally, how is the effectiveness of the market mechanism in pro-
ducing efficiencies likely to affect the size of the defense budget? The
most significant of these questions is that relating to possible extension
of the market mechanism, and I shall meet it squarely. The present re-
volving-fund enterprises in the Defense Department, now responsible
only for current operations in peacetime, should be made responsible for
capital-budgeting of the assets they operate.
As a preliminary, I would like to inject a brief historical note. The
earliest example of the market mechanism in defense, at least used by
any organization that still exists, was that of the Navy Stock Fund,
founded in 1893. It functions as a wholesale and retail organization
both for items purchased for personal use by Navy personnel and for
items used by the Navy; parallel organizations now exist for the other
services, for the Marines, and for the Department of Defense as a whole.
There was no significant example of another such organization prior to
1950. The majority of the present organizations, of which there are
more than ten, came into existence in the years 1950—53, having been
authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, the same act that
created the Department of Defense. Besides the five stock funds, there
are four industrial funds, so named because they produce goods and
services, two or more management funds, whose activities are highlyMarket Mechanism in Defense Department 175
miscellaneous but emphasize travel bureau and freight-forwarding
types of activities, and the Civil Defense Procurement Fund, which in
effect is the sixth stock fund.
Under McNamara and Hitch the scope of these activities increased,
with special emphasis on defensewide funds, one of which was newly
created and one renamed. There was also a renewal of interest in their
functioning and in measures of their success.
Now consider a couple of these questions relating to the over-all
management problem, in the context of which the market mechanism
should be viewed. Defense is the archetype of a public good, a good
that is most suitable for outright production by the national government,
and neither left entirely to private enterprise nor merely bought under
contract from the private sector, like highways and other public works.
Moreover, unlike most other activities, the success in shaping defense
forces is judged in almost inverse relationship to the extent that these
forces actually have to be used, so that a good defense program must
be evaluated largely in analytical and conjectural terms, rather than by
the test of performance. (It might appear that in the actual conduct of a
war performance by the military commanders is readily observable
and even measurable, so that there would be more chance to employ
market mechanisms than in peacetime; but this proposition has an aca-
demic flavor, inasmuch as in practice social policy moves toward less
rather than more use of market devices with the onset of a war, both in
the operation of the military establishment itself and in the management
of the economy as a whole.)
The context within which the over-all defense program must be
appraised consists of the perceived potential threats to the nation's
vital interests, and the national military objectives we might pursue
should any of these threats materialize and provoke us to action.
Within this context, the nation's armed services offer alternative actual
and hypothetical capabilities, such that a larger well managed budget
provides the means to pursue more ambitious objectives than does a
smaller one. The main responsibility of the nation's civilian leader-
ship in defense-programming is to weigh the threats and possible objec-
tives against the resource costs of alternative broad capabilities, and to
make the choice among those capabilities.
The history of these choices since the Second World War suggests
considerable stability for long periQds in the size of the military budget,176 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
which is revised mainly when the perceived external threat changes.
First, in 1945—47, there was a brief return to the near-disarmament of
the 1920's and 1930's. Then, in the period 1947—50, the political
leadership took the position that this nation could afford something
under 15 billion dollars for defense, in view of the expansionism of the
USSR. The Korean War raised the figure to around $45 billions, where
it stayed throughout the 1950's while ballistic missiles replaced conven-
tional armies as the main weapon of our armed forces. In the early
sixties the present Secretary of Defense set the figure at $51 billions,
before the current fiscal year, and reintroduced strong conventional
forces because of a more pessimistic appraisal of the threat of guerilla
and Korea-type wars than had prevailed previously.
This capsule history suggests that the use of the market mechanism
in the Defense Department, other things being equal, will make no
difference at all in the size of the defense budget. The political leader-
ship makes a rough judgment of the appropriate budget level in the
light of its view of the external threats; and improvements in efficiency
will to a first approximation be translated into increased military capa-
ablities. That is, the elasticity of demand for military capabilities is
approximately minus one.
A necessary condition for efficiency in this over-all context is that the
objectives selected by the national leadership be transmitted effectively
to the lower levels of decision-making, in such a way that lower-level
decisions will be consistent with the larger objectives. In particular, the
leadership must specify clearly what threats are taken seriously and
what broad capabilities are desired to cope with them. To the extent
that the devices of decentralized decision-making play a role in the
process, the objectives of the decentralized units in the system must be
reconciled with each other and with those of the higher leadership.
Thus it is insufficient to set budgets for the decentralized units or to
make their expenditures dependent on their receipts in a quasi-commer-
cial operation; it is also necessary to verify that their activities serve
the appropriate objectives. If criteria of performance are clear-cut and
enforced, it is reasonable to expect that decentralized decision-makers
will be motivated to operate economically and to seek expansion of the
activities for which they are responsible. In view of the over-all unit
elasticity of demand for defense capabilities, it is reasonable to suppose
that in most cases the demand for subordinate defense activities will beMarket Mechanism in Defense Department 177
clastic; besides sharing the over-all unit elasticity, they may substitute
for other competing defense activities if they achieve unexpectedly low
costs for particular capabilities. This prospect offers considerable scope
for something resembling the profit motive in decentralIzed defense
management.
Decentralization requires that the Congress and the national leader-
ship delegate a measure of control over individual line-item appropria-
tions to lower decision levels, giving those lower levels appropriate dis-
cretion over the use of the funds, subject to the objectives just dis-
cussed. Budgets must be appropriated for broad expenditure-categbries
reflecting over-all objectives, and the details of how the money is spent
left to the lower levels. The best current example of this is the appro-
priations class for operations and maintenance expenses, and there are
many others. (Of course, there may also be a decentralized process
through which the requests for line-item appropriations are developed,
and this is probably the more promising line for further development
of decentralized management devices.) Where lower-level discretion
exists, it may be used in dealings either with internal or with external
markets. Internally, resource costs can be translated into prices that one
decentralized unit charges another, and the latter may weigh these prices
against those of alternative means of serving the same objectives.
The measurement problems in appraising the performance of de-
centralized units in the defense context, the limitations of the decen-
tralized system, and the ways it might be extended are the subjects of a
chapter I have written for Enke's forthcoming book,3 and I shall com-
ment only briefly on them here. In its most important decisions and
characteristics the defense organization must be centralized. Some direct
supervision of the choice between weapons systems, and of provision for
their support, deployment capability, and so on, is necessary for the pur-
suit of a rational set of national objectives. The national leadership must
decide on the allocation of resources among major military capabilities,
and must determine strategic objectives, tactical matters with political
implications, and operational constraints. The President and his ad-
visers can more easily delegate to the services and to their suborganiza-
tions some of the less important, "unglamorous" matters of resource
management, which ought not to take up the time of key people at the
8StephenEnke, ed., Defense Management, New York, 1967.178 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
highest levels. These matters include strategic mobility, logistics, and
supply: areas already subject to a degree of decentralized decision-
making in routine peacetime operations, using an internal market mech-
anism. Here the measurement of performance can berelatively
straightforward, because the systems involved can be tested and exer-
cised routinely under a close approximation to emergency conditions;
such testing occurs perforce whenever an international crisis blows up
that stops short of war.
These considerations apply also to programming support forces for
war emergencies; a logical way to extend the market mechanism in
the Defense Department would be to make the present quasi-commercial
enterprises responsible for the planning of their capital equipment, and
to include it in their pricing mechanisms. The procedures by which this
suggestion might be implemented are spelled out in the cited chapter.
The key element of these procedures is that the military services should
bear the cost of this equipment in their budgets in proportion to their
expected emergency demands on it; for example, the Army should
pay the Military Air Transport Service for the latter's commitment to
airlift army personnel, equipment, and supplies to potential theaters of
hostilities on an agreed delivery schedule. The Army's airlift require-
ment would be set by national policy for such situations, and by a com-
parison of the costs of alternative modes of meeting its deployment re-
quirement as measured by the internal prices for airlift,sealift, and
forward-basing and stockage. The MATS capital plan would be the
least-cost one for meeting the combined requirements of this type of all
the military services. Similar procedures would apply to capital equip-
ment and emergency reserve stocks managed by the other revolving-fund
enterprisesinthe Defense Department.This procedure contrasts
sharply with their present procedures and responsibilities.
The revolving-fund enterprises, representing a conscious attempt to
use the market mechanism within the Defense Department, currently
have revenues on the order of $12 billion annually, and working capital
whose book value is about the same figure. However, these numbers
omit important resources employed by these enterprises. The current
account has no entry for depreciation nor any for the pay and allow-
ances of military personnel, and the capital account has no entry for
major equipment and facilities, such as transport aircraft, ships, and
military bases. If these items were included using conventional book-Market Mechanism in Defense Department 179
keeping, these enterprises would account for more than 20 per cent of
annual Defense resource use. The largest such enterprises are the Mili-
tary Air Transport Service, the Military Sea Transport Service, the
Naval Shipyards, the Defense Supply Agency, and the separate service
supply enterprises.
A discussion of the characteristics of some of these enterprises will
help to highlight their strengths and weaknesses.
The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) plays little or no role in
determining the quantity of military airlift procured by the Defense
Department nor the size of its support base in men and equipment.
In the operations of this airlift in peacetime, however, MATS has vir-
tually unlimited discretion in the purchase of fuel and spare parts, and of
whatever contractor maintenance it may require over and above the
maintenance provided by Air Force facilities. It also has virtually un-
limited discretion in setting up its route structure and in assigning partic-
ular equipment to these routes. Thus it has some scope for attaining
efficient operations; and such study as there has been of this matter sug-
gests that MATS has done a good job with this discretion. However,
there is less reason for optimism about its dealings with its customers.
It charges a complicated form of average-cost prices, which differ spec-
tacularly from marginal costs on the back-haul direction of most routes.
Its direct customers, for their part, are subject to centralized direction
on the selection of items for air versus other forms of transport; they
have some incentive to make good use of whatever discretion is left to
them if savings remain under their control, as is true if something like
O-and-M funds are involved, but very little incentive otherwise.
This situation contrasts with that of the Naval shipyards. Manpower
and equipment levels are set by Congress, with no recognizable relation-
ship to emergency or wartime requirements. There is no resort to private
contractor maintenance or construction comparable to that for aircraft.
Whatever scope or incentive for economical resource use they may have
is hard to identify or describe. Where construction is involved, the same
observation applies to the customer, the Navy Bureau of Ships. In the
case of repairs, however, something approaching rational incentives pre-
vail for the customer. The maintenance and condition of the ships of
each type (e.g., destroyers) is the responsibility of the "type commander,"
who receives a definite budget for this purpose. He in turn allocates a
budget to each ship as its turn comes for repairs. Although the yard's180 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending
cost estimates for different repair and maintenance jobs may have little
relationship to rational pricing, the ship's commanding officer is clearly
obliged to sort out his priorities in an orderly manner. This officer would
not like his record to show either that he required unusually large sums
to keep his ship in good condition nor that it was in poor condition
when he relinquished command to another officer.4
These comments give some idea of the variety of possible conse-
quences of attempts to simulate the market mechanism in the Defense
Department. In some cases, such as the government operated ord-
nance factories, resource use is politically determined and the simula-
tion of the market mechanism is entirely nominal. In other cases, typi-
cally where O-and-M funds are involved, and where there may be resort
to private firms, the incentives to orderly, efficient resource use may
bear comparison with those in the private sector.
The current rpceipts of organizations appear in Table 1, for
fiscal 1966. The numbers give a fair idea of the comparative importance
of the different organizations, so far as current operations are con-
cerned. The largest by this measure is the Army Stock Fund, with ex-
pected receipts of $2.28 billions in this fiscal year; the smallest is the
Civil Defense Procurement Fund, with expected receipts of $20,000.
However, all except this. smallest one run in the hundreds of millions.
The Naval shipyards just discussed are included in the Navy Industrial
Fund, which also includes the Military Sea Transport Service, Naval
ordnance factories, and other activities. The Military Air Transport
Service is part of the Air Force Industrial Fund.
The proposal that these organizations should be responsible for pro-
gramming their capital equipment, reserve stocks, etc.; that they should
determine the structure and emergency scheduling of these capital goods
which most efficiently meet the demands of the military services, and
should price them at marginal cost to the military services; implies a
dramatic broadening of their scope and authority. It would definitely
mean less central decision-making than is now the case for the capital
goods under consideration, which are programmed through a bargain-
ing process among the services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense; the Budget Bureau and the Congress also
4 commentson MATS and on Naval shipyards are partly based on un-
published work at IDA by Stanley Besen and John Haldi, respectively.Market Mechanism in Defense Department 181
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Industrial 690 197 430 280
Stock 2280 120 130 138 a 180
Management 290 162
play a significant role. Although the present system purports to aim at
the most economical collection of capital goods to do the job, few of the
parties involved have any incentive to push in the right direction. The
Army tends to demand almost unlimited airlift, for example, because
the budgetary costs of airlift are likely to cost a smaller reduction in
the Army's active forces than would the use of forward stockage. The
Air Force resisted the airlift program until it was faced with a large
prospective supply of unemployed pilots due to the, phasing-out of
manned bombers. With pressures like those at work, it is difficult for a
centralized system to come anywhere near the most economical deci-
sion.
Because of the very large sums involved in airlift, sealift, and for-
ward-stockage, amounting to several billion dollars over the next few
years, these activities are the most interesting area in which to test the
idea of devolving the responsibility for capital on the indus-
trial funds that operate them. These activities are also particularly in-
teresting because of their critical support role in an emergency situation.
It is true that the same procedures can and should be applied to the
emergency reserve stocks controlled by the stock funds, but the sums
involved are relatively small and the uneconomical errors in program-
ming probably slight by comparison. Service-owned shipyards and or-182 InstitutionalStructures and Defense Spending
nance factories could be closed down with great advantage to the
country and their activities turned over to the private sector of the
economy entirely, following the example set by the Air Force; and few
tears would be shed for them. Emergency reserve capacity should of
course be contracted for, after the manner of the emergency troop lift
contracted for in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet; such arrangements are the
analogue in the private sector of the proposed arrangements for pro-
gramming of the capital goods operated by the industrial and stock
funds.
The tantalizing question remains whether the market mechanism
could also be employed within the Defense Department as part of the
process of programming the major weapons and combat forces of the
armed services—bombers, ships-of-war, tanks, and troops? This was
Lerner's celebrated proposal, although he presented it as a way to ope-
rate after the shooting starts; here I would prefer to consider it in rela-
tion to long-range defense planning. The analogue of Lerner's proposal
in this context would be to allocate a budget to each of the unified
commanders in the theaters where we have unified commands, and let
him allocate it among different types of weapons and forces, support,
deployment capability, paying prices set at true marginal costs. By
contrast with the approximately 20 per cent of defense resource use
covered by the type of thing I have previously discussed, this proposal
would put virtually the entire defense budget within the scope of the in-
ternal market mechanism.
My earlier remarks about objectives point up an aspect of the prob-
lem that Lerner's proposal, as reported, did not touch on.5 For such an
arrangement to be tolerable, the President would have to specify un-
ambiguously his position on threats, national objectives, and constraints
in each area of the world. For example, for a hypothetical Korean or
Southeast Asian war he would have to specify whether the use of nu-
clear weapons on Chinese cities and installations would be part of ac-
ceptable war plans for programming purposes. (He might also direct
force-planning to be based on the several possible ways such wars
might be fought.) He would also have to specify his choices between de-
Extensive quotations from Lerner's paper appear in Hitch and McKean,
The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp.
222—23.Market Mechanism in Defense Department 183
ploying small forces quickly or larger forces more slowly, to satisfy the
same over-all objectives, when alternative choices along these lines imply
different numbers of casualties, different amounts of temporarily lost
territory, different damage to the country defended, and different peace-
time budgets for our Defense Department. Theater commanders always
comply with such directives of course, although not always with en-
thusiasm. Satisfactory compliance is a key element of performance that
would have to be monitored thoroughly if such a system were to be
made workable.
In addition, it would have to be verified that each commander was
in fact buying the over-all capabilities as directed by the President. A
theater commander who happened to be an admiral might see little
need for any forces other than carrier task forces, even though these
have little capability to fight a land war; one who happened to be an
Air Force general might wish to win every war with land-based air-
power alone, although this strategy suffers from essentially the same
defect. A similar problem can be involved in the intraservice choice
between one weapon and another, such as the choice that had to be made
between the battleship and the carrier, and the more recent one between
the manned long-range bomber and the ballistic missile. The necessary
measuring of performance in this context would be hard to distinguish
from centralized control.
Nevertheless one can imagine the use of budgets and the market
mechanism as a framework for achieving more orderly defense pro-
gramming in which military experience and judgment could make its
maximum contribution. It would require the development of new skills
in the military services, such as the calculation of marginal-cost prices
for their systems, whose complexity would compare with that of the
combination of a multiple-product firm and a public utility. In this and
other matters it would require a way of approaching problems that
would no doubt be regarded as unmilitary. We might well regard these
attributes of the use of the market mechanism as the main arguments
in its favor, however.
These remarks are intended to highlight both the merits and the
problems of the market mechanism in the Defense Department, both
as it now operates and as it might be extended. The feature of the prob-
lem of defense management that differs most from the private sector is184 Institutional Structures and Defense Spending
the necessarily centralized character of the final decisions about national
objectives, which must be transmitted as commands or directives. The
success of a lower-level organization in satisfying these directives can
be comparatively easily measured in some cases, but not in others. This
measurement difficulty is probably our best indicator of the likelihood of
any further extensions of the use of the market mechanism in defense.